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Posted Nov 12, 2021, 12:24 AM
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Registered User
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Join Date: Dec 2016
Location: San Francisco
Posts: 24,177
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Quote:
Originally Posted by JManc
SF doesn't strike me as a place Rx companies would set up shop and exploit the local community. It's an affluent cosmopolitan major city (regardless of the homeless population) where most people sit at a desk compared to lower income blue collar towns who work with their hands and are prone to aliments and/or less than stellar lifestyles which make them an easy mark to be taken advantage of.
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I think it's wrong to blame "drug companies". From what I've seen, it was ONE drug company, Purdue Pharma, the maker of Oxycontin, doing most of the damage. The evidence of this, aside from all the inside politics known mostly to doctors (I'll explain in a minute), is that there are lots of orally effective opiates from morphine itself to Dilaudid to Percodan to many others that never became street drugs the way Oxycontin did and some of them are more potent than Oxycontin.
But the main reason I particularly fault Purdue was their very effective lobbying campaign all over the country to convince legislators with no medical training that American doctors were near-universally under-treating pain because they were chary of the addictive potential of opiates. The narrative according to Purdue, that was accepted by certain prominent doctors on the Purdue payroll and transmitted to state legislators all over the country, was that opiates weren't addictive when used to manage real pain and only when abused by addicts without pain and so they could be prescribed widely and in massive amounts to genuine pain victims (or almost anybody claiming to be).
The solution proposed by Purdue was "re-educating" doctors to believe this by forcing them to accumulate "continuing education" credits annually in pain management classes that pushed the Purdue line. California adopted this policy but so did other states.
Here's how one author puts the story:
Quote:
From 1996 to 2001, Purdue conducted more than 40 national pain-management and speaker-training conferences at resorts in Florida, Arizona, and California. More than 5000 physicians, pharmacists, and nurses attended these all-expenses-paid symposia, where they were recruited and trained for Purdue's national speaker bureau. It is well documented that this type of pharmaceutical company symposium influences physicians’ prescribing, even though the physicians who attend such symposia believe that such enticements do not alter their prescribing patterns.
One of the cornerstones of Purdue's marketing plan was the use of sophisticated marketing data to influence physicians’ prescribing. Drug companies compile prescriber profiles on individual physicians—detailing the prescribing patterns of physicians nationwide—in an effort to influence doctors’ prescribing habits. Through these profiles, a drug company can identify the highest and lowest prescribers of particular drugs in a single zip code, county, state, or the entire country. One of the critical foundations of Purdue's marketing plan for OxyContin was to target the physicians who were the highest prescribers for opioids across the country. The resulting database would help identify physicians with large numbers of chronic-pain patients. Unfortunately, this same database would also identify which physicians were simply the most frequent prescribers of opioids and, in some cases, the least discriminate prescribers.
A lucrative bonus system encouraged sales representatives to increase sales of OxyContin in their territories, resulting in a large number of visits to physicians with high rates of opioid prescriptions, as well as a multifaceted information campaign aimed at them. In 2001, in addition to the average sales representative's annual salary of $55 000, annual bonuses averaged $71 500, with a range of $15 000 to nearly $240 000. Purdue paid $40 million in sales incentive bonuses to its sales representatives that year.
From 1996 to 2000, Purdue increased its internal sales force from 318 sales representatives to 671, and its total physician call list from approximately 33 400 to 44 500 to approximately 70 500 to 94 000 physicians. Through the sales representatives, Purdue used a patient starter coupon program for OxyContin that provided patients with a free limited-time prescription for a 7- to 30-day supply. By 2001, when the program was ended, approximately 34 000 coupons had been redeemed nationally.
The distribution to health care professionals of branded promotional items such as OxyContin fishing hats, stuffed plush toys, and music compact discs (“Get in the Swing With OxyContin”) was unprecedented for a schedule II opioid, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Purdue promoted among primary care physicians a more liberal use of opioids, particularly sustained-release opioids. Primary care physicians began to use more of the increasingly popular OxyContin; by 2003, nearly half of all physicians prescribing OxyContin were primary care physicians. Some experts were concerned that primary care physicians were not sufficiently trained in pain management or addiction issues. Primary care physicians, particularly in a managed care environment of time constraints, also had the least amount of time for evaluation and follow-up of patients with complicated chronic pain.
Purdue “aggressively” promoted the use of opioids for use in the “non-malignant pain market.” A much larger market than that for cancer-related pain, the non–cancer-related pain market constituted 86% of the total opioid market in 1999. Purdue's promotion of OxyContin for the treatment of non–cancer-related pain contributed to a nearly tenfold increase in OxyContin prescriptions for this type of pain, from about 670 000 in 1997 to about 6.2 million in 2002, whereas prescriptions for cancer-related pain increased about fourfold during that same period. Although the science and consensus for the use of opioids in the treatment of acute pain or pain associated with cancer are robust, there is still much controversy in medicine about the use of opioids for chronic non–cancer-related pain, where their risks and benefits are much less clear. Prospective, randomized, controlled trials lasting at least 4 weeks that evaluated the use of opioids for chronic, non–cancer-related pain showed statistically significant but small to modest improvement in pain relief, with no consistent improvement in physical functioning. A recent review of the use of opioids in chronic back pain concluded that opioids may be efficacious for short-term pain relief, but longer-term efficacy ( > 16 weeks) is unclear.
In the long-term use of opioids for chronic non–cancer-related pain, the proven analgesic efficacy must be weighed against the following potential problems and risks: well-known opioid side effects, including respiratory depression, sedation, constipation, and nausea; inconsistent improvement in functioning; opioid-induced hyperalgesia; adverse hormonal and immune effects of long-term opioid treatment; a high incidence of prescription opioid abuse behaviors; and an ill-defined and unclarified risk of iatrogenic addiction.
A consistent feature in the promotion and marketing of OxyContin was a systematic effort to minimize the risk of addiction in the use of opioids for the treatment of chronic non–cancer-related pain. One of the most critical issues regarding the use of opioids in the treatment of chronic non–cancer-related pain is the potential of iatrogenic [doctor-caused] addiction. The lifetime prevalence of addictive disorders has been estimated at 3% to 16% of the general population. However, we lack any large, methodically rigorous prospective study addressing the issue of iatrogenic addiction during long-term opioid use for chronic nonmalignant pain.42
In much of its promotional campaign—in literature and audiotapes for physicians, brochures and videotapes for patients, and its “Partners Against Pain” Web site—Purdue claimed that the risk of addiction from OxyContin was extremely small.
Purdue trained its sales representatives to carry the message that the risk of addiction was “less than one percent.” The company cited studies by Porter and Jick, who found iatrogenic addiction in only 4 of 11,882 patients using opioids and by Perry and Heidrich, who found no addiction among 10,000 burn patients treated with opioids. Both of these studies, although shedding some light on the risk of addiction for acute pain, do not help establish the risk of iatrogenic addiction when opioids are used daily for a prolonged time in treating chronic pain. There are a number of studies, however, that demonstrate that in the treatment of chronic non–cancer-related pain with opioids, there is a high incidence of prescription drug abuse. Prescription drug abuse in a substantial minority of chronic-pain patients has been demonstrated in studies by Fishbain et al. (3%–18% of patients), Hoffman et al. (23%), Kouyanou et al. (12%),55 Chabal et al. (34%), Katz et al. (43%), Reid et al. (24%–31%), and Michna et al. (45%). A recent literature review showed that the prevalence of addiction in patients with long-term opioid treatment for chronic non–cancer-related pain varied from 0% to 50%, depending on the criteria used and the subpopulation studied . . . .
Opioid prescribing has had significant geographical variations. In some areas, such as Maine, West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, southwestern Virginia, and Alabama, from 1998 through 2000, hydrocodone and (non-OxyContin) oxycodone were being prescribed 2.5 to 5.0 times more than the national average. By 2000, these same areas had become high OxyContin-prescribing areas—up to 5 to 6 times higher than the national average in some counties . . . .
The increasing OxyContin abuse problem was an integral part of the escalating national prescription opioid abuse problem. Liberalization of the use of opioids, particularly for the treatment of chronic non–cancer-related pain, increased the availability of all opioids as well as their abuse. Nationwide, from 1997 to 2002, there was a 226%, 73%, and 402% increase in fentanyl, morphine, and oxycodone prescribing, respectively (in grams per 100 000 population). During that same period, the Drug Abuse Warning Network reported that hospital emergency department mentions for fentanyl, morphine, and oxycodone increased 641%, 113%, and 346%, respectively. Among new initiates to illicit drug use in 2005, a total of 2.1 million reported prescription opioids as the first drug they had tried, more than for marijuana and almost equal to the number of new cigarette smokers (2.3 million). Most abusers of prescription opioids get their diverted drugs directly from a doctor's prescription or from the prescriptions of friends and family . . . .
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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2622774/
You will note that this extensive review of what happened mentions one and only ONE drug company: Purdue Pharma. And I believe that's correct. I never encountered the kind of misinformation from other companies I did from Purdue nor have I heard stories of other companies lobbying or similar efforts to use the ignorance of bureaucrats to further their greed.
If you Google "CME Pain" (that's Continuing Medical Education) you will still find page after page of courses designed to meet state "pain management" requirements except now that the Purdue-inspired fallacy that we were under-treating pain and needed to be educated to prescribe MORE opiates has been shown to be utterly false, these courses must now undo the damage by trying to educate doctors on the appropriate and inappropriate use of opiates, something that, for the most part, they were doing before Purdue started marketing Oxycontin.
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