Ottawa LRT Public Inquiry

[Williamoforange]

Originally Posted by swimmer_spe

I got a great idea, if you cannot do it for that price, don't bid on it.

Yeah, 3 companies bid on the project 2 of which apparently put in bids within the budget.

There been more then a few pointed line of questions from the inquiry lawyer where the conclusions are just, well that fact was known to RTG/Alstom and of there own volition decided to participate anyways. There was no break in period? well that was in the contract to begin with, The schedule was reduced by a year? well RTG/Alstom agreed to it, being among them.

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Mayor, contract thrown under the bus on Day 3 of LRT public inquiry
Themes emerge about how city may have set stage for LRT trouble

Joanne Chianello · CBC News
Posted: Jun 16, 2022 4:00 AM ET | Last Updated: 4 hours ago

When Jim Watson promised during his 2010 mayoral campaign that the first part of the Ottawa light rail line would be on time and on budget, he likely couldn't have imagined the banal political slogan would become a centrepiece of a public inquiry a dozen years later.

But Watson's insistence during that campaign that Stage 1 of the Confederation Line be kept to a $2.1-billion price tag — despite the fact that figure was a preliminary estimate — has been one of the focal points in the first few days of the much-anticipated LRT public inquiry.

It was a key line of questioning Wednesday to former deputy city manager Nancy Schepers from commission co-lead counsel John Adair.

Adair pointed to a 2009 report to council from Schepers, an engineer, that showed $2.1 billion was an early estimate and could go up or down by as much as 25 per cent as more details were confirmed.

But once Watson began campaigning on a $2.1-billion price tag, that number took on a life of its own, argued the lawyer.

"My simple point is that Mr. Watson, as he then was, and the other members of council who ran on that platform of $2.1 billion — on time, on budget — were making the very promise to the public that you, as an experienced professional, were not prepared to make to council, right?" Adair asked.

"In the absence of estimates, I agree," said Schepers. "Yes."

But she also told Adair that she wasn't too fussed by Watson's political mantras, which she's heard before.

"It's not the first time that has happened," Schepers said.

"And, you know, as staff, we report to council. And if that was unrealistic and we at any point said, 'You know, this is not possible,' then we would have to do our homework and we would have to justify that in front of committee and council."

The first three days of the four-week inquiry has revealed a number of core themes the commission seems set to scrutinize, from whether politics improperly constrained budgets and timelines to whether the details of the contract ultimately failed.

The inquiry has heard several times how the budget cap was a potential problem and a number of key players testified they worried no one would bid at that price.

On Tuesday, another commission lawyer asked the former city treasurer if there had been any discussions about whether the price cap might lead companies to "overpromise" in order to meet the budget.

Political pressure on the budget and the timeline are not the only ways in which inquiry lawyers have been drilling down into whether city decisions — made even before the contract was awarded — contributed to the Confederation Line's troubles.

One such decision? Going with a private-public partnership, or P3 model, in its contract with Rideau Transit Group (RTG).

The Confederation Line was the first time this funding model was used for a municipal LRT project in Ontario, the inquiry heard.

That's why provincial officials — including Watson, who was just fresh from stepping down from the Ontario Liberal cabinet in late 2009 — wanted Infrastructure Ontario to advise the city in setting up the contract.

One of the key components of this kind of funding model for transit is that the winning proponent designs, builds and maintains the system, but also takes on part of the financing.

In the case of the Confederation Line contract, RTG took on $300 million in private financing, which the city would pay back as part of its monthly fee payments on the 30-year maintenance contract.

This private financing actually costs the city, because a municipality can usually borrow at a much lower rate than corporations. In 2012, the city estimated it was going to pay $165 million more in interest over 30 years than if it had borrowed the money itself.

(Interestingly, the inquiry heard Wednesday that in May 2011, the city was not contemplating including private financing in its contract, unless the other levels of government paid for the additional cost. They didn't, but the city went for a design-build-finance-maintain — or DBFM — model anyway.)

Despite it being more expensive for the city, proponents of public-private partnerships say private financing provides the company with extra incentive to finish on time because the payments don't start until the project is handed over.

The arrangement is supposed to create a healthy "tension" that propels the companies to meet the project schedule.

But Adair argued that once the project was more than a year late, the model starved RTG of much-needed cash.

Until it handed over the light rail system, RTG wouldn't get its final milestone payment of more than $200 million, while costs — including servicing the $300 million debt — kept piling up.

"RTG was under enormous financial pressure because of the model," Adair posited to Schepers, suggesting that the consortium was getting "killed financially."

Schepers pushed back, arguing that RTG partners — SNC-Lavalin, ACS Infrastructure and Ellis Don — were big players who should have known what they were doing.

Still, Adair argued, RTG couldn't afford to keep delaying its handover date — but at the same time, couldn't ask the city not to enforce the contract because that's "not an option" under the model.

"The guiding principle at all times has to be looking at what's in the best interest of the people of Ottawa, regardless of what the contract says," Adair suggested to Schepers, who only allowed that there should be flexibility.

Wednesday was not the first time this week that commission lawyers have suggested that the city holding to the contract — or at least enforcing it in its strictest sense — has been detrimental not just to RTG partners, but to the people of Ottawa.

On Friday, former RTG CEO Antonio Estrada is set to testify about, among other things, how the city handled the Rideau Street sinkhole.

First, on Thursday, Yves Declercq from train-maker Alstom, and Manuel Rivaya of OLRT Constructors are scheduled to appear.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottaw...ract-1.6490547

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Alstom didn't have time to research Ottawa's labour market for LRT bid, claims rails weren't right before August 2021 derailment
The LRT public inquiry commissioner was also told Alstom also didn't have time to nail down its supply chain for the Citadis Spirit trains being used on the Ottawa system.

Jon Willing, Ottawa Citizen
Jun 16, 2022 • 3 hours ago • 4 minute read

Alstom didn’t have time to examine Ottawa’s labour expertise when the French train maker was quickly assembling a bid with Rideau Transit Group, the LRT inquiry commissioner heard Thursday.

With Alstom trying to design its Citadis train for the overseas market while trying to meet a bid deadline for the City of Ottawa’s Stage 1 LRT project, there wasn’t time for the company to research the availability of skilled workers in Ottawa, Yves Declercq said.

Declercq, a veteran Alstom manager who was director of the Citadis Spirit train program, testified on Day 4 of the inquiry that the company was even trying to determine where it would assemble trains for Ottawa’s project shortly before RTG’s bid was due to the city in 2012.

The commissioner heard Alstom also didn’t have time to nail down its supply chain for the Citadis Spirit trains, which would be an adapted design requiring significant modifications from the parent Citadis model used in other parts of the world.

“During the window of time, we didn’t have time to look at every little detail of the local market,” Declercq told commission co-lead counsel Christine Mainville.

In a similar line of questioning by city lawyer Jesse Gardner, Declercq said the LRT project’s 25-per-cent Canadian content rules for the vehicles meant Alstom had to assemble the vehicles in Ottawa since it wasn’t possible to get the train parts from Canadian suppliers.

Alstom discovered quickly there was a “limited qualified local (workforce) for industrial manufacturing,” Declercq said. When the company secured workers, many of them left once they were trained and were able to write “Alstom” on their résumés, Declercq said.

“It’s a whole system we’re just beginning to understand,” he testified.

Worker availability became an issue later in the maintenance phase of the LRT program as Rideau Transit Maintenance, an RTG affiliate whose main subcontractor is Alstom, tackled a backlog of work.

Declercq said he wasn’t responsible for the maintenance part of Alstom’s involvement in Ottawa LRT.

It was a bit of a shock for Alstom to find itself involved with Ottawa’s LRT project.

RTG’s first choice for a train, one developed by CAF, was rejected by the city, prompting RTG to call Alstom for a train proposal mere months from the city’s bid deadline, the commission has heard.

Alstom originally wanted to do part of the LRT job, but didn’t make it past the qualification stage, so it was surprised to be contacted by another consortium to pitch a train product for the Ottawa project, Declercq said.

For Alstom, it was another chance to get a foothold in the North American market.

Declercq addressed the August 2021 derailment and offered a new reason for the out-of-service train leaving the tracks near Tunney’s Pasture Station, based on a root-cause analysis recently completed.

The derailment has been characterized as an axle failure.

Declercq said Alstom believed the rails weren’t designed as the company expected, potentially creating excess stress on the wheel component.

According to Declercq, the axle issue was known to the company before the Ottawa project, but the component wearing happened much more quickly in Ottawa, prompting the company to send experts to understand why.

RTG lawyer Gordon Capern challenged Declercq’s evidence, noting RTG hadn’t provided input to Alstom’s root-cause report.

Declercq claimed the rails weren’t correctly put down, but Capern suggested there was no independent evidence to suggest the rails were non-compliant.

The maintenance plan to keep the trains safe has Alstom checking and testing the train wheels every 7,500 kilometres.

The inquiry commission has exposed disagreements between RTG subcontractors.

There were problems with coordinating Alstom and signalling system provider Thales. The technology used by each of those two companies informs the work of the other.

Declercq said there seemed to be no one at Ottawa Light Rail Transit Constructors (OLRTC), the construction arm of RTG, making sure the different project pieces were in sync. He highlighted a particular problem getting information from Thales, creating delays.

“To my memory, there was no designated person for system integration,” Declercq said.

Manuel Rivaya, a former Dragados Canada executive who was on the oversight committee for OLRTC, said there were disputes between the construction group and its engineering contractor when it came to systems integration.

The public can watch all hearings of the LRT inquiry on video screens set up at Fauteux Hall at the University of Ottawa, online at www.ottawalrtpublicinquiry.ca or on Rogers TV (channels 470 in English and 471 in French).

On Friday, the commission is scheduled to hear from Antonio Estrada, who was CEO of RTG during most of the construction phase of the LRT system, and Rupert Holloway, who at one point was project director for OLRTC.

Justice William Hourigan is the inquiry commissioner.

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https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local...021-derailment

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Sinkhole slowed LRT work, but city had little patience for delays, inquiry hears
"When the other party chooses to go by the book in a contract like this, progress is always more difficult in all aspects."

Matthew Lapierre, Ottawa Citizen
Jun 17, 2022 • 16 hours ago • 3 minute read

The city had little patience for delays after a sinkhole slowed work on the downtown section of Ottawa’s LRT, the former head of Rideau Transit Group told a public inquiry on Friday.

Antonio Estrada, the CEO of RTG during most of the construction phase of the LRT system, testified on Day 5 of the Ottawa Light Rail Transit Commission that, after a sinkhole appeared near the intersection of of Sussex Drive and Rideau Street on June 8, 2016, the relationship the builders had with the city shifted.

The sinkhole, which swallowed a chunk of Rideau and a minivan, appeared as LRT workers excavated soft ground in the area to build the Confederation Line. Estrada said it took months afterward for tunnelling to resume.

But the city, fearing delays to the project, agreed work should instead accelerate; a mitigation plan was put into place to speed work and not change the original deadline of May 2018.

“I think the city didn’t want to hear about delays at that time, in 2016,” Estrada said. “At the end, RTC agreed to develop a plan to try to recover, and they honestly believed at the beginning that, even though the plan was aggressive, they could reach the revenue service in May 2018.”

The recovery plan included double shifts for workers, weekends on the job, and more resources were poured into the project, Estrada said, but the logistical hurdle of the flooded tunnel could not be overcome quickly.

After the sinkhole, and, with the looming possibility of project delays, Estrada said the relationship between RTG and the city shifted. “The situation changed a bit,” he said. “I think the city took a much more contractual approach after that.”

City technical staff who met with Estrada and with whom he had resolved issues previously began telling him they had to bring decisions to their supervisors. Estrada gained the impression that decisions were now being made at city management level, where he felt there was less flexibility.

“The city was cooperative from the beginning,” he said, “and, after the sinkhole, not just after the sinkhole, but especially after it was obvious that the sinkhole would cause a huge delay in the project, I think that the situation changed and the project team, the technical team, I felt that the decisions were moved from them to a higher level and this higher level was less cooperative and more contractual than it used to be on the technical team.”

The change in the relationship led to more discussions between RTG and the city. Smaller issues had to be sent up the chain of command more frequently.

“When the other party chooses to go by the book in a contract like this, progress is always more difficult in all aspects,” Estrada said. “That makes our life much more difficult in a situation that was already difficult.”

Rupert Holloway, who sat on the Ottawa Light Rail Transit Constructors executive committee through 2017 into May 2018 and later was project director, testified Friday that the sinkhole had “an incredibly disruptive influence on the overall project,” and contributed to a delay of as long as nine months

Holloway explained how, as city deadlines for the project arrived and were missed, work was accelerating and pressure was mounting — due in part, he acknowledged in response to a city lawyer, because OLRT was promising it could hit those deadlines, but not delivering. In the end, the relationship with the city deteriorated.

“I think as the pressure came on,” Holloway said, “and we were late and we were struggling to give certainty and schedule for some of the reasons we talked about already about the integration challenge and the fact that we kept finding new issues on a progressive emerging basis, that put a lot of strain on the relationship because obviously the city wanted certainty and we were struggling to give them the certainty that they wanted, and over time that led to the relationship deteriorating.”

https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local...-inquiry-hears

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Wayward systems integration under scrutiny in Day 6 of LRT inquiry
The integration of the different Ottawa LRT systems — specifically, the Alstom Citadis Spirit train with the Thales train control system — has become a theme during the LRT inquiry.

Jon Willing, Ottawa Citizen
Jun 20, 2022 • 13 hours ago • 4 minute read

Integration between trains and the control system has emerged during the LRT inquiry as a classic chicken-or-egg head-scratcher.

Did the train maker slow down the train controller in the development of Ottawa’s LRT system, or was it the other way around?

Perhaps it was a third scenario: did their shared client do a poor job of getting them on the same page?

The integration of the different Ottawa LRT systems — specifically, the Alstom Citadis Spirit train with the Thales train control system — has become a theme during the LRT inquiry and it came up again Monday on Day 6 of the hearing.

Michael Burns, the Thales project manager on the Ottawa LRT system, shot down claims previously heard during the inquiry that his company’s train control system for Ottawa was brand new.

Thales supplied the communications-based train control (CBTC), which has computers on the trains and communications equipment along the railway that tell the train what to do. The information is sent to a control centre that tracks the train movements.

Burns said Thales’s CBTC system was proven since it had been used in other parts of the world. The technology was adapted for Ottawa.

However, it would be the first time a CBTC system would be installed in a low-floor light rail vehicle, the commission heard.

It was another first for the Ottawa LRT project. The Citadis Spirit, while based on a parent Alstom Citadis model, was designed for Ottawa.

“That train development was much later than originally planned, which meant we couldn’t start our testing of how the train would respond to the CBTC system,” Burns testified.

On the other hand, in his own testimony last week, Alstom’s Yves Declercq said the train maker faced delays because Thales wasn’t producing the required documentation for the control system, plus Thales requested train design changes to fit the control equipment.

Alstom and Thales have no direct contractual relationship on the LRT project. Both companies were contracted by Ottawa Light Rail Transit Constructors (OLRTC), which is the Rideau Transit Group’s construction and design arm for the project.

The testimony from Burns and Declercq shared one common element: both said OLRTC didn’t seem ready for system integration.

According to Burns, OLRTC “had challenges fulfilling that role in providing a competent system integrator that would be the mediator between two parties that are trying to come to a mutual agreement about how they’re going to interface with each other.”

On top of that, the timelines for deliverables in Alstom’s and Thales’s individual contracts with OLRTC didn’t line up, the commission heard.

The two companies tried to work out the integration questions on their own.

Burns said one would think the meetings between Thales and Alstom would whittle down the number of issues, “but it didn’t appear to be a diminishing list.”

A 2016 letter from Burns to OLRTC expressed Thales’s concern that OLRTC didn’t have resources for systems integration.

Burns testified that an OLRTC contract manager seemed to be the one tasked with integration before OLRTC brought on a credible integrator.

According to Burns, Thales was sending warnings a year before the original May 2018 handover date that the LRT system wouldn’t be ready by then.

There’s still outstanding train-control work on the Stage 1 LRT system.

The automated train control system has not yet been commissioned in the maintenance and storage yard, Burns said.

But on the main line, when it comes to the train control, it should be all systems go from now on.

“The trains and the signalling are communicating and to the best of our knowledge there aren’t any more surprises to be found,” Burns said.

The city’s financial guru for transit projects, Remo Bucci, testified earlier in the day.

Bucci, a civil engineer who has worked at Deloitte since 2000, has been the city’s go-to financial consultant for most of the LRT project, acting as a top consultant in both Stage 1 and Stage 2.

In Stage 1, Bucci said the city was very interested in interface issues, particularly the train wheel-to-rail interface. The city wanted to make sure the customer experience, and how customers “feel the ride,” was top-notch, he said.

“That rail-wheel interface is where you feel that,” Bucci said.

Inquiry lawyers have often circled back to the $2.1-billion project budget.

Commission counsel Liz McLellan showed Bucci a September 2011 email he wrote to other project advisers about the main issues when it came to the city’s affordability goals.

The $2.1 billion budget was a “highly politically sensitive target,” Bucci wrote in that email, before adding, “concern is that detractors will be seeking any opportunity to criticize the project if this target is not met.”

Pressed by commissioner Justice William Hourigan to identify the “detractors,” Bucci said it was no one in particular, chalking up his description to “loose drafting” of his email.

In other questioning, Bucci told city lawyer Peter Wardle that it’s not unusual for projects to have an affordability cap and Deloitte believed the city’s financial estimates were rightly based on the initial LRT designs.

“As far as we were concerned, the city followed best practices,” Bucci said.

The public can watch all hearings of the LRT inquiry on video screens set up at Fauteux Hall at the University of Ottawa, online at www.ottawalrtpublicinquiry.ca or on Rogers TV (channels 470 in English and 471 in French).

On Tuesday, the scheduled witnesses are Lowell Goudge, an Alstom train systems engineer, and Jacques Bergeron, who served as integration director for OLRTC.

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https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local...of-lrt-inquiry

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Key suppliers behind Ottawa's LRT not co-ordinated, inquiry hears
Companies that built Ottawa's trains and their computerized controls often siloed

Kate Porter · CBC News
Posted: Jun 21, 2022 4:00 AM ET | Last Updated: 4 hours ago

The group that built Ottawa's Confederation Line didn't do a great job meshing Ottawa's new light rail trains with the computer system that controls them, a public inquiry has heard.

That lack of integration could even have led to the door problems riders experienced after the train system launched, one witness suggested on Monday at the commission investigating breakdowns on Ottawa's LRT.

Alstom manufactured the trains for Ottawa's LRT, while Thales Canada Inc. provided the computerized signalling system that controls braking and propulsion, doors, sensors along the tracks and more.

It was up to Rideau Transit Group's construction arm, OLRT Constructors, to do the critical job of merging the two companies' systems. The Confederation Line was the first time that a Thales communications-based train control system was being integrated with a low-floor light rail vehicle, commission lawyers pointed out.

At the public hearings into the breakdowns on Ottawa's light rail system, however, Thales project manager Michael Burns testified that he tried to draw the train builder's attention early on to how his company and Alstom were having to sort out issues in silos rather than collaboratively.

"They had challenges in fulfilling that role," he said of OLRT Constructors.

The commission investigating Ottawa's light rail system heard a similar conclusion last Friday from Rupert Holloway, a SNC-Lavalin vice-president and civil engineer who took on oversight of building the train system at OLRT Constructors from May 2018 to May 2019.

He testified that Ottawa's train system involves thousands of complicated digital devices, and integrating the Confederation Line's systems was "crucial."

Holloway gave the example of how several systems would need to work together if there were a fire on a train in the tunnel. The train's computers would need to detect the fire and tell the control room at Belfast Road, fresh air would need to flow to riders as they evacuated, and elevators would need to turn off to prevent other riders from descending to the tunnel.

In hindsight, Holloway said RTG's construction arm spent a lot of time focusing on building the tunnel — "a world-class piece of civil engineering" — but lost focus when it came to "the integration challenge."

"We certainly failed in regards of tackling that challenge as effectively as we could have done," Holloway told the commission.

Ottawa's LRT even received a bad grade six months before the original date in 2018 when the system was to be handed over to the City of Ottawa.

OLRT Constructors had hired consultant SEMP Ltd. to do a "health check" on whether Ottawa's system was on track to be up-and-running and safe.

"The level of system engineering on the project to date is considered to be substantially below the minimum acceptable level for a project of this size and complexity," the consultant summarized in November 2017.

"This was a real catalytic moment for us," Holloway said. OLRT Constructors then spent more than $20 million to fly in experts from the United Kingdom to help fix the gaps, he said.

Burns described a couple of instances in which Alstom had made changes to the way the trains would behave, unbeknownst to Thales.

During pre-launch testing, he said Thales discovered Alstom had changed software so that a train would stop if the emergency brake was applied too many times, for safety reasons. Meanwhile, Thales had its own test for the emergency brakes.

Then, after residents began riding the train in 2019, Burns said there was an instance when a woman was caught when a train door closed prematurely.

Burns explained Thales would have expected the door to re-open if something blocked it from closing. After investigating, it found Alstom had assigned a different command to that signal.

Thales then had to modify the software to prevent that door issue.

The inquiry also heard that Thales has still not completed its work on the first stage of the Confederation Line. Under the contract, Thales was supposed to install its control system at the the maintenance and storage facility on Belfast Road, but hasn't finished.

Burns said the non-automated system in the rail yard slows down the launch of LRT system in the mornings.

The issue of integrating various systems is expected to be discussed further Tuesday morning, when Alstom's Lowell Goudge is scheduled to testify. Goudge oversaw the train system integration and was the safety certifier for Alstom.

In the afternoon, the commission will hear from Jacques Bergeron, who was responsible for integrating the Thales and Alstom systems from 2014 to 2018.

With files from Joanne Chianello

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottaw...uiry-1.6495187

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LRT maintenance director was on poorly maintained train that derailed last September

Jon Willing, Ottawa Citizen
Jun 21, 2022 • 3 minutes ago • 2 minute read

Passengers on a train that derailed near Tremblay Station last September included the LRT maintenance director and his family, the LRT inquiry commission has learned.

Rideau Transit Maintenance’s Steven Nadon told his story during an interview with commission co-lead counsel Christine Mainville in April.

Transcripts of interviews have been released over the past month, and on Tuesday the revelation that Nadon had been on that train came out during the inquiry hearing.

Nadon isn’t scheduled to testify during the hearing, but his transcribed interview provides his account of Sept. 19, 2021, the day an Alstom Citadis Spirit train left the tracks near Tremblay Station.

“I was on that train prior to its derailment. I got off at that station where it had derailed. I had my family on there, my grandchildren just going for a joy ride. We were taking the train and it was the first time on the train, they were excited,” Nadon said in his interview.

As the train travelled between St. Laurent and Tremblay stations, Nadon said, he heard a “clinging sound beneath me and I thought a cable had come loose, or something was dragging.

“So I told my wife, ‘We’re going to get off at the next station because I don’t think this train is going to make it to our final destination, it’s going to get pulled out of service. We’ll just take the next one.'”

Nadon and his family got off the train at Tremblay Station, “and I was on my phone calling the control centre to say, ‘Take this train out of service,’ when the train departed.

“And as it departed it kicked ballast up all over the platform. Immediately I knew it had been derailed,” Nadon said, going on to describe how all the wheels weren’t on the rail and he was on the phone trying to get the train to stop.

The train operator has told officials he didn’t feel anything, which Nadon in his interview said he could understand since the derailed wheels were far from the cab.

None of the 12 passengers still on the train was injured in the derailment. It was the second derailment in as many months on the Confederation Line.

The cause of the September derailment has been attributed to human error in train maintenance. Bolts on a wheel hub weren’t properly torqued before the train left the maintenance facility.

Nadon’s presence on the train as it was derailing wasn’t widely known, even among Rideau Transit Group subcontractors.

Alstom’s lead engineer on the LRT project, Lowell Goudge, testified Tuesday he had just found out Nadon was on the train.

Under questioning by city lawyer Jesse Gardner, Goudge said he didn’t know until sometime in the past week that RTM’s director of maintenance was on the derailed train.

Gardner suggested there was video capturing Nadon looking at the train at the station, and the lawyer noted Nadon didn’t physically do anything to stop the train, like prevent the doors from closing.

The commission investigation has involved several lawyers representing key parties protecting their clients’ interests and positions during the inquiry.

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'We started with known issues': Alstom engineer says LRT system had deficiencies at launch
Lowell Goudge's testimony also focused on the reasons Alstom believed the trains were experiencing unanticipated stress.

Jon Willing, Ottawa Citizen
Jun 21, 2022 • 2 hours ago • 4 minute read

That rocky start to Ottawa’s $2.2-billion LRT system?

It was bound to happen, judging by the evidence collected so far by the LRT inquiry commission.

LRT officials knew they were allowing the Confederation Line to open while accepting risks that could harm the reliability of the multibillion-dollar transit system, the inquiry commissioner heard Tuesday.

Meanwhile, Alstom, the supplier of the first-ever Citadis Spirit trains, continues to advance its claim that Confederation Line tracks weren’t constructed to the specifications it expected, causing a surprising amount of stress on the vehicles.

Day 7 of the hearing featured evidence from a top Alstom engineer, who explained that the LRT system, while safe, had shortcomings when it launched in September 2019.

Lowell Goudge, Alstom’s lead engineer on the Citadis Spirit trains and safety certifier for the vehicles, testified there was a list of deficiencies.

“We started with known issues,” Goudge said.

The “minor deficiencies” included items considered to be acceptable as long as the trains could deliver safe service to fare-paying customers and mitigation measures were put in place, Goudge said.

Operators had security concerns with the the cab door; they believed the locks resembled locks that could be simply purchased off Amazon, Goudge said. In another case, there was a dimmer light in the cab that could not be turned all the way off, sometimes creating glare.

The reliability of train doors was also shaky going into the LRT system’s launch.

Goudge said updated software for the doors hadn’t been implemented and wasn’t yet certified. The certification process for the software takes two or three months, but there wasn’t enough time to get the door software certified for the first day of operations. Instead, Alstom used a past certified version even though there were reliability issues, Goudge said.

There were several door “faults” in the first months of LRT operations, impacting transit service. The doors became the first indication to the city that something wasn’t quite right with the trains. The software was eventually updated, vastly improving door functions.

Before the handover from Rideau Transit Group to the city, there were concerns that there wasn’t enough time to break in the LRT system before it opened in September 2019.

Goudge said it wasn’t until the summer of 2019 that multiple trains started hitting the line for testing. There wasn’t much time to make any necessary changes before launch.

“If you haven’t run the trains for some time, you will have problems on Day 1,” Goudge said.

Goudge’s testimony also focused on the reasons Alstom believed the trains were experiencing unanticipated stress, particularly after an August 2021 derailment near Tunney’s Pasture Station.

In that derailment, an overheated roller bearing in the wheel assembly led to the wheel severing from the axle.

According to evidence during the inquiry, Alstom believes the tracks weren’t built to the design specifications it expected as it prepared the Citadis Spirit trains.

Goudge said one of Alstom’s findings was that the track gauge — the distance between the rails — was narrow. The company took measurements on parts of the tracks that had never seen a train, like the rails behind the buffer at Blair Station and around the maintenance and storage yard.

One conclusion Alstom made was “we were taking excessive loads in the curves,” Goudge said.

The vibration on the train bogies, which hold the wheel and axle components, was also more than Alstom expected, he said.

Outside the hearing, RTG defended itself and its construction affiliate against Alstom’s allegations.

“The LRT tracks were built to the specifications of the Project Agreement, and, before being put into service, the system was reviewed and certified by many experts, including the Independent Certifier, as well as a third-party reviewer as chosen by the City,” said Helen Bobat, spokesperson for RTG and its affiliated organizations.

Back at the hearing, commission co-lead counsel Christine Mainville asked Goudge if the trains were safe for the travelling public.

“The trains are safe to ride,” Goudge said. “I would have not signed the safety certificate if I did not believe they are safe to ride.”

The inquiry commissioner, Justice William Hourigan, also heard testimony from Jacques Bergeron, who was in charge of integrating the Alstom trains and Thales train control system for RTG affiliate Ottawa Light Rail Transit Constructors (OLRTC).

OLRTC didn’t appoint a systems integrator to the project until roughly a year after LRT contract was signed. Bergeron filled that role.

The commissioner has heard there were early problems integrating the Alstom trains and Thales train control system, especially when it came to the expectations each company had of the other. Alstom and Thales didn’t have a direct contractual relationship; they were contracted separately by OLRTC.

Delays on the railway construction led to delays preparing the trains and control system.

When it came to the Alstom-Thales testing program and operator training, Bergeron said the “big hiccup” was not getting access to a four-kilometre test track in the east end at the end of 2016. There was only one kilometre to work with for much of 2017, Bergeron said.

Bergeron retired at the end of August 2018. At that time, the trains and signals were still not fully integrated.

The public can watch all LRT inquiry hearings on video screens set up at Fauteux Hall at the University of Ottawa, online at www.ottawalrtpublicinquiry.ca or on Rogers TV (channels 470 in English and 471 in French).

On Wednesday, the scheduled witness is Alstom project director Bertrand Bouteloup, followed by a panel of experts from Parsons and Delcan.

jwilling@postmedia.com
twitter.com/JonathanWilling

https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local...cies-at-launch

[rakerman]

If primary sources are your thing, here's the Alstom report on the August 8, 2021 derailment:

Documentary Evidence
Exhibit 091 - Alstom LRV 1119 Derailment Investigation Report 10 May 2022 (PDF)

[rocketphish]

Everyone knew LRT would have problems out of the gate — except customers
"There was no secret between them and us."

Jon Willing, Ottawa Citizen
Jun 22, 2022 • 3 hours ago • 4 minute read

Everyone knew Ottawa’s LRT system wasn’t going to work well out of the gate — everyone, it seems, except transit customers.

There was more evidence entered at the LRT inquiry on Wednesday that hammered home an accepted reality inside the project: the $2.2-billion Confederation Line would have problems from the start.

Day 8 of the inquiry started with the Alstom project manager who oversaw the train maker’s role on the Ottawa LRT.

Until the end of 2021, Bertrand Bouteloup supervised Alstom’s LRT projects in Canada, including Ottawa’s.

The consequences of launching the LRT system in September 2019 were “well-known by everyone” and there was tension leading up to the system handover to the city, Bouteloup said.

According to Bouteloup’s evidence, Alstom confirmed that the trains met safety requirements to transport passengers, but it didn’t mean the LRT system would run perfectly in the start of operations, and it seemed all stakeholders knew it, including Rideau Transit Group (RTG) and the city.

However, Bouteloup said the outstanding deficiencies didn’t need to block the LRT handover to the city.

Reports produced by Alstom tracked the number and type of main “events” on Citadis Spirit trains before the handover on Aug. 30, 2019.

During the pre-handover testing, between Aug. 3 and Aug. 26, there were 145 events, mostly related to communication systems, such as video recording and passenger information displays. One camera problem was solved by placing spotters on the station platforms.

There were also events related to mechanical brakes, voltage and traction and air supply.

Another report for the period between Sept. 2 and Sept. 7, just before the Sept. 14 opening of the LRT system, recorded 42 events.

Bouteloup said ideally he would hope that a mature system would only generate a couple of events per day, but that week in September had between two and 10 daily events.

There were hesitations about the launch process more than a year before the Confederation Line opened to the public.

Bouteloup said Alstom was trying to convince its client in early 2018 to adopt a “progressive manner” for launching the LRT system by gradually increasing the number of trains on the line. Ottawa Light Rail Transit Constructors, RTG’s construction and design affiliate, wouldn’t have it.

“We would immediately go into full service. That was the answer we received,” Bouteloup said.

As project manager, Bouteloup tried to keep morale among workers high while letting managers absorb the stress generated by the contract and schedule requirements.

Alstom had found itself at the centre of chatter about the LRT project as the public started speculating about the status of the trains.

“I didn’t want the team to get discouraged,” Bouteloup said.

RTG was contracted to have 15 trains available for peak-hour service on opening day, but the number was decreased to 13 trains during the testing period before the system handover to the city.

The demand on the LRT system posed immediate challenges, even with the reduction of required trains at the start of operations.

Bouteloup, who oversaw the vehicle supply to the project, said the company’s maintenance division knew the workload that was coming down the tracks after the handover. Alstom is the main maintenance subcontractor for the LRT system.

“There was no secret between them and us,” Bouteloup said.

The inquiry commissioner, Justice William Hourigan, also heard evidence Wednesday from three transit experts who worked on the LRT project as city consultants.

Mike Palmer, Jonathan Hulse and Thomas Fodor of Parsons were contracted by the city for LRT advice, including in areas of operational readiness, maintenance preparation and safety.

All three consultants testified they knew there would be problems with reliability when the LRT system went into service.

Hulse said he believed the vehicles needed to go through a “reliability growth” period and the testing wasn’t thorough enough.

On the positive side, Palmer said OC Transpo staff learning the ropes of an LRT system under difficult circumstances were “impressive” and enthusiastic to begin the job.

However, the consultants saw red flags with the work by RTG contractors, including in systems integration, which the inquiry commission has learned was a major challenge during the project.

Fodor recalled he was monitoring maintenance operations from the yard control centre during the trial run and it was clear that RTG had trouble keeping working trains on the main line. The maintenance team was overwhelmed by trains coming back for fixes.

“We realized, ‘We have a problem,'” Fodor said.

The public can watch LRT inquiry hearings on video screens set up at Fauteux Hall at the University of Ottawa, online at www.ottawalrtpublicinquiry.ca or on Rogers TV (channels 470 in English and 471 in French).

On Thursday, scheduled witnesses are Richard Holder, OC Transpo’s director of engineering, who was a manager in the city’s rail construction office, and Monica Sechiari, the LRT project’s independent certifier from Altus Group.

jwilling@postmedia.com
twitter.com/JonathanWilling

https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local...cept-customers

[lrt's friend]

If there were known problems, why did they cancel parallel bus service when they did? They were trying to save money at the expense of their customers. In the long run, this was counterproductive, and likely saved nothing when confidence in the system was driving customers away.

[rocketphish]

City knowingly accepted defects with LRT and lowered trial run criteria
Public inquiry's 9th day most damning for the city — so far

Joanne Chianello · CBC News
Posted: Jun 24, 2022 4:00 AM ET | Last Updated: 8 hours ago

The evidence heard Thursday on the ninth day of public inquiry into the Confederation Line was the most damning for the city so far.

The City of Ottawa willingly accepted a light rail system it knew was likely unreliable and changed criteria to make it easier for Rideau Transit Group to pass the final testing of the Confederation Line.

Testimony from city engineer and rail manager Richard Holder confirmed that the city accepted the LRT — and put it into service — while making a calculation it would fix problems after passengers began riding.

"I'm going to suggest to you that the city knew that there were reliability issues with the system at the time that it decided to launch public service," commission co-lead counsel Kate McGrann said to Holder in one particularly illuminating exchange.

"We knew that there would be some reliability issues," he responded. "Yes, we did. We didn't anticipate that there would be reliability issues to the extent that we would have derailments."

McGrann persisted: "The city knew that the reliability issues could interfere with the provision of reliable service to the public?"

Holder responded that train-maker Alstom, which is also the company in charge of maintenance, had been reporting improvements.

"That is not an answer to my question, sir," said McGrann. "My question was, the city knew that there were reliability issues that could interfere with the provision of reliable service to the public."

"That's correct," Holder replied.

In late April of 2019, when the LRT was a year late, Rideau Transit Group (RTG) told the city the LRT was substantially complete.

It was an important last step in the process of handing over the Confederation Line to the city — and one that came with a $59-million payday.

But the city rebuffed RTG's substantial completion claim and the project's independent certifier sided with the city. In a May 2, 2019 letter to RTG, the city said 25 vehicles had defects that were "extensive and ongoing and result in a lack of access to the complete fleet.

"The vehicles have not been shown to be reliable."

On July 26, 2019, RTG reapplied for substantial completion, and this time the city — and the independent certifier — accepted.

But it turns out the city agreed the LRT was basically finished — and paid out $59 million — even though there was a long list of outstanding problems it decided to waive and defer.

These were not so-called minor deficiencies, which are allowed under the contract, but items that "could be considered to be quite significant, [a] key one being the number of vehicles that would be available at revenue service availability," testified Holder.

The unresolved items included the light rail vehicles — all 34 of them. There wasn't a single rail car that didn't have an open issue.

Another outstanding problem the city waived? A system-wide "failure to meet fleet requirements due to ongoing defects/deficiencies."

It's unclear why the city would agree the Confederation Line was substantially complete while aware of these details, but Holder testified that the city believed the train defects would improve between substantial completion and before RTG handed it over to the city, which turned out to be just a month later.

As well, the Confederation Line had to go through a period of trial running before the city accepted it, which Holder said added another layer of protection for the city.

Although the light rail contract called for a 12-day trial test period, the requirements for what constituted a pass were vague — so the city and RTG agreed between them on the specific criteria in 2017.

But in the lead-up to the 2019 trial run, the city and RTG's construction arm agreed on a generally tougher version of the scorecard. The inquiry heard that the LRT performance called for in 2019 better mirrored what the city was expecting in a light rail system, as per the contract.

But within days of the start of the trial running, Holder got called in to speak with senior city leadership to discuss the criteria.

And when the independent certifier from Altus Group sent the city its validation statement of the trial running dated Aug. 23, 2019, it described how the criteria was changed back to the 2017 version during the trial run period.

First, the requirement to run 15 trains during morning and afternoon rush hours was reduced to 13.

"They were having challenges to get 15 trains in the morning," Holder told the commission.

As well, the performance measure that indicates how many trains are out on the track for customer service and for how long — called the aggregate vehicle kilometre availability ratio, or the AVKR — was lowered to 96 per cent from 98 percent.

And that bar of 96 per cent would only have to be met on nine of the trial test days — not each of the 12 days. So the system could experience three terrible service days in less that two weeks, and those days wouldn't be counted.

Finally, there was a requirement that the train reliability (again, the AVKR) not fall below 90 per cent on any day of the trial testing.

But that was changed to a requirement that no three consecutive days see train availability below 94 per cent, meaning RTG could have — in McGrann's words — "two very bad days" and still pass.

RTG successfully completed the trial run on Aug. 22, 2019, and the next day Mayor Jim Watson announced the city would officially take over the Confederation Line — and that the city would open it to the public on Sept. 14.

Holder said the system was safe and that he never received any specific advice not to launch it. RTG felt it was ready and would incur significant penalties if the system didn't work, he pointed out.

McGrann asked Holder if there continued to be reliability issues after both substantial completion and after the LRT was launched, and Holder agreed.

He said the city "was aware the reliability of the system would improve" but that at the start of public launch "there may be issues that would impact availability."


With files from Kate Porter

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottaw...ting-1.6499918

[rocketphish]

City's push to open LRT in October 2018 a 'utopian' dream, rail executive says
On Friday, the public inquiry commission headed by Justice William Hourigan marked the halfway point in its investigation of the construction and operation of the Confederation Line.

Blair Crawford, Ottawa Citizen
Jun 24, 2022 • 3 hours ago • 2 minute read

The pressure to meet deadlines and for Ottawa’s Confederation Line to begin revenue service was unlike any the director of the LRT construction team had ever experienced, the inquiry into the troubled train heard Friday.

“The level of attention from the media and politicians was quite intense and not something I’d experienced before,” Matthew Slade testified Friday on Day 10 of the Ottawa Light Rail Transit Commission.

Slade held several senior positions during the project, including overseeing the scheduling and as director of Ottawa Light Rail Constructors. He’s been involved in many similar projects, including building a new line on the London Underground in England.

“It was clear from meetings with councillors and city staff that the pressure was far greater than I’ve seen on other projects,” Slade said in response to questions from the commission’s co-lead counsel, Christine Mainville.

“It was clear, reading news articles and seeing media and watching what was going on, that several people had been very vocal about delivering the project and the schedule and had made promises to have it finished and in service by a particular date,” he said.

“Are you referencing the mayor’s office?” Mainville asked.

“Yes, the mayor’s office,” he replied.

“The mayor specifically?” Mainville asked.

“Yes.”

Slade was the first witness on Friday as the commission before Justice William Hourigan marked its halfway point of its investigation into construction and operation of the Confederation Line.

Slade described how his early analysis suggested the LRT would be ready to open in March 2019, but the city pushed to have a start date in November 2018, a date he considered unrealistic, possible only, he said, “in a utopian world.”

“The stars would have to align,” he told the commission.

In fact, the system was not ready for testing until August 2019 and didn’t open for passengers until Sept. 14, 2019.

Slade testified that he urged the city to consider a “partial launch,” running trains only on the east portion between Blair Station and the University of Ottawa, but that was rejected out of hand when he suggested it to John Manconi, then OC Transpo’s general manager.

“It was another flat refusal,” Slade said. “I wasn’t even give five minutes of the floor to have a conversation.”

Later Slade urged the city to consider a “soft launch” with full train service, but on reduced hours, from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. for example, to reduce stress on the system and to give more time to address problems. That too was rejected, he said.

“I would never contemplate opening a rail system without a soft opening,” Slade said.

In afternoon testimony, Yang Liu of trainmaker Alstom was grilled by City of Ottawa lawyer Sharon Vogel about derailments that have bedevilled the system. Vogel questioned Liu about an improperly torqued bolt that was blamed for a September 2021 derailment that shut down the LRT for nearly two months. A shift change at the maintenance yard meant the train was returned to service without proper inspection.

“At the time there was a lack of oversight by Alstom in regards to the refurbishing work, correct?” Vogel said.

“Looking back at it, yes,” Liu agreed.

The inquiry resumes Monday.

https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local...executive-says

[rocketphish]

Former RTG boss says city requested less-strict trial run requirements
Peter Lauch, who left the CEO job in July 2020, said RTG didn't ask for changes to the trial running criteria, but he said the city made the offer through OC Transpo director Troy Charter.

Jon Willing, Taylor Blewett, Ottawa Citizen
Jun 29, 2022 • 10 hours ago • 4 minute read

The city asked for the LRT trial running criteria in 2019 to be changed to less-strict criteria established two years earlier, the former CEO of the Rideau Transit Group testified on Wednesday.

Peter Lauch, who left the CEO job in July 2020, said RTG didn’t ask for changes to the trial running criteria, but he said the city made the offer through OC Transpo director Troy Charter.

John Manconi, the city’s former general manager of transportation, testified on Tuesday that he remembered Lauch asking to use trial running criteria developed in 2017.

On Wednesday, which was Day 13 of the inquiry hearing, Lauch said he disagreed with Manconi’s testimony.

Inquiry commissioner Justice William Hourigan has heard several accounts of how the criteria were tweaked in the middle of trial running in August 2019.

The 2017 criteria had an “aggregate vehicle kilometre” performance requirement of 96 per cent in nine of 12 days of trial running.

The criteria changed in 2019, with RTG supporting a 98-per-cent performance requirement over 12 days.

Lauch agreed with commission co-lead counsel Kate McGrann that the 2019 criteria better prepared RTG’s maintenance division for revenue service. He also agreed with city lawyer Sharon Vogel that the 2017 criteria were “reasonable.”

In Lauch’s version of the events, the city offered to revert back to the 2017 criteria. It came as the LRT system was struggling to hit performance standards during trial running.

In an email Lauch sent to RTG executives on Aug. 15, 2019, he explained the city’s “non-negotiable offer” that changed the trial running criteria and reduced the number of trains required for peak service, from 15 double-car trains to 13 trains.

The commissioner has heard only 13 trains were necessary to meet Transpo’s ridership at the time.

A memo from Lauch to the city on Aug. 16, 2019, confirmed the trial running would be based on the 2017 criteria.

RTG would go on to pass the trial running requirements with a performance of 97 per cent.

In questions to a group of city councillors on the witness stand Wednesday afternoon, commission counsel Chris Grisdale highlighted a discrepancy in access to information about the decision to loosen the trial running criteria.

Transit commission chair Allan Hubley, who was part of a WhatsApp group that included the mayor, city manager and city transportation boss John Manconi, recalled being briefed that the criteria were being changed.

Grisdale pointed out that he received this information before the other councillors testifying Wednesday – Catherine McKenney, who sits on the transit commission, and Diane Deans – and “in fact, they only received that information after trial running was declared a success and after the criteria had in fact been changed,” said Grisdale.

Hubley said every committee chair has these kinds of briefings with staff; it’s not unique to the transit commission or the LRT issue.

While Deans, a longtime council member and former chair of the transit commission agreed that committee chairs are given a lot of information because of the position they occupy, she contended that had she been given the kind of update Hubley received in this case, “it would have been very important for me to ensure that that was shared with all members of council in a timely fashion,” and later added: “it goes right to the heart of system readiness.”

And it wasn’t just her fellow elected officials that Deans accused of holding back important information. She recalled a September 2018 presentation by Manconi to council’s finance and economic development committee in which “he said quite clearly that the city was not prepared to accept any dilution of the prescribed trial running requirements.”

She also raised a memo that Manconi came close to sending to council when trial running was paused after a difficult start. He ultimately didn’t do so, after city manager Steve Kanellakos reminded Manconi of their commitment to only update council after trial running was finished.

Between both of these instances, “there was a significant, in my estimation, omission of information that council should have had,” Deans testified.

She wasn’t the only witness Wednesday with complaints about inadequate sharing of LRT-related information outside a bubble of select city hall staff and politicians.

Grisdale reminded the commission of testimony the previous day about engineering consultant STV raising concerns with the city in the spring and summer of 2019 about the maintenance readiness of RTM, an affiliate of RTG. In response to questions from Grisdale, citizen transit commissioner Sarah Wright-Gilbert confirmed that she hadn’t received information about this and would have liked to.

“In my view, without this information, we were as commission members casting about in the darkness trying to figure out why all of a sudden our brand new system has all of these issues compounded one on another.”

For his part, city lawyer Peter Wardle argued the importance of the separation of council’s role – generally, policy matters and oversight of staff – and staff’s responsibility to handle operational issues.

Ultimately, he said, the commissioner is going to have to determine, when it comes to the trial running period, “what was pertinent, what was not pertinent, what was an engineering or technical decision, and what was something that had to be communicated to council.”

The public can watch LRT inquiry hearings on video screens set up at Fauteux Hall at the University of Ottawa, online at www.ottawalrtpublicinquiry.ca or on Rogers TV (channels 470 in English and 471 in French).

On Thursday, Mayor Jim Watson is scheduled to testify after Derek Wynne of SEMP and Sergio Mammoliti of TUV Rheinland.

https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local...n-requirements

[J.OT13]

No shit. And the City tried to convince us the bar was not lowered for the trial run or opening. "What do you mean 15 trains? We never said that!?"

[ponyboycurtis]

Originally Posted by J.OT13

No shit. And the City tried to convince us the bar was not lowered for the trial run or opening. "What do you mean 15 trains? We never said that!?"

Talk about gaslighting eh? These daily reports are strangely satisfying to read while equally horrifying.

[ponyboycurtis]

Is anyone else watching Jimmy getting cut up on the stand right now?

I will provide a link.

https://www.ottawalrtpublicinquiry.c...ay-14-june-30/

It started at 2pm but seems to be far from over.

*edit* This private WhatsApp chat is a SPICY meatball!

[stolenottawa]

Originally Posted by ponyboycurtis

Is anyone else watching Jimmy getting cut up on the stand right now?

I will provide a link.

https://www.ottawalrtpublicinquiry.c...ay-14-june-30/

It started at 2pm but seems to be far from over.

*edit* This private WhatsApp chat is a SPICY meatball!

Adair is really like a dog with a bone.

[mykl]

WHY does Jimmy keep calling WhatsApp "What's Up?"

He's been brutal at answering questions.

Also, regarding the Rideau sinkhole, we're all well aware that that a van fell in, but its been 6 years and I just heard the other day that a large piece of construction equipment fell into the hole. Then today the counsel for RTG (her name isn't showing on the screen at the moment) said that a roadheader fell into the sinkhole. Am I losing my mind or is RTG trying to inflate their claim for their lawsuit? There wouldn't have been a roadheader above ground at this location to have fallen into the sinkhole, and surely if there's a van video, someone would have had a video of a giant roadheader falling in. Am I losing it?

[Richard Eade]

Yes, a piece of construction equipment ‘fell’ into the wash-out. I believe it was a Genie-lift. It was fished out, as far as I remember, but the van was not.

As for the roadheader, it was the machine that was down in the tunnel. Remember, the till which filled that valley was saturated with water. The roadheader, digging eastward, broke out of the bedrock, reaching the saturated till. Water began to seep into the tunnel, signaling that there was little time to evacuate. There was no finger to plug this ‘dyke’ and the hydraulic pressure within the till rapidly enlarged the hole into the tunnel. This was like pulling the plug of a full bathtub. The water and rubble quickly flowed into the tunnel, flooding it to about 300 metres back from the cutting face. They were lucky that the tunnel was running on a downward grade from the Parliament/Parlement Station, since the water could only rise so far. The cavity formed by the wash-out left nothing to support the roadway above it, which collapsed, taking the van and Genie-lift with it.

So, Yes, RTG lost a roadheader in the wash-out. It was destroyed by being submerged for weeks as the sludge was pumped out of the tunnel. But, No, it did not ‘fall into’ the crater created by the wash-out.